United Nations
Department of Peace Operations (DPO)
Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA)
Department of Operational Support (DOS)
Ref. 2022.06

Standard Operating Procedure

Weapons and Ammunition Management in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Processes

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Effective date:	1 April 2022
Contact:	DPO/OROLSI/DDRS
Review date:	1 April 2025

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE
ON WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT FOR DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION ACTIVITIES

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A. PURPOSE AND RATIONALE

1. This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) describes the practices and procedures to be followed when United Nations (UN) Mission personnel involved in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes are required to undertake tasks related to weapons and ammunition management. It provides DDR practitioners with step-by-step direction and guidance to the safe and secure management of weapons and ammunition – from receipt to ultimate disposal – based on the relevant international standards and guidelines: the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) and the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS).

2. This SOP shall be used as a basis to develop individual Mission-specific SOPs on WAM in DDR processes. Mission-specific SOPs on WAM in DDR processes should cover all disarmament and weapons and ammunition management related activities implemented by the DDR component in the mission area.

3. Effective arms control is critical to preventing and reducing armed conflict and crime; and to supporting recovery and development. Poorly regulated and illicit weapons and ammunition can fuel insecurity, while poorly managed ammunition and explosives cause serious safety concerns.

   DDR processes include two arms control components:

   a) Disarmament as part of a DDR programme in contexts where the preconditions for such programmes are present.

   b) Transitional WAM as a DDR-related tool.

4. Disarmament is usually seen as the first step in a DDR programme and involves the voluntary handover of weapons, ammunition and explosives. It refers to the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons held by combatants, and often also by the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms-management programmes.

5. Transitional weapons and ammunition management (WAM) comprises a series of interim arms control measures that can be implemented by DDR practitioners before, alongside and after DDR programmes. Transitional WAM can also be implemented when the preconditions for a DDR programme are absent. The transitional WAM component of a DDR process is primarily aimed at reducing the capacity of individuals and groups to engage in armed violence and conflict. transitional WAM also aims to reduce accidents and save lives by addressing the immediate risks related to the possession of weapons, ammunition and explosives. Transitional WAM can also be linked with other DDR-related tools, such as Community Violence Reduction (CVR).

6. WAM is defined in Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) 4.11 as “the oversight, accountability and management of arms and ammunition throughout their lifecycle, including the establishment of frameworks, processes and practices for safe and secure materiel acquisition, stockpiling, transfers, tracing and disposal.” It must be carried out in compliance with national legislation and relevant international, regional and sub-regional arms control instruments.

B. SCOPE

7. This SOP applies to DDR activities of all UN peacekeeping operations, and it must be implemented in accordance with their respective mandates. This SOP also serves to guide DDR staff or staff with equivalent functions in special political missions. The SOP covers collection, handling, transportation, storage and disposal of weapons, ammunition and explosives in integrated DDR processes as part of a UN Mission. Unless otherwise specified, the use of the terms “Weapons and Ammunition Management” and “WAM” encompass the management of all ammunition, explosives, weapons and weapons-related equipment. All personnel directly involved with and supporting disarmament operations as part of DDR programmes (IDDRS 4.10) and transitional WAM (IDDRS 4.11) must be familiar with this SOP and with all relevant SOPs specific to the wider Mission. The Mission headquarters (HQ) should make this SOP available to all partners external to the Mission that may be involved in DDR-related activities, such as the host nation’s government authorities and relevant non-governmental organisations.
8. Although not the primary purpose, this SOP may be used by national governments as a template to help develop national SOPs for WAM where no such procedures currently exist. UN personnel supporting national authorities in non-mission settings may also utilize this SOP.
9. This SOP is written for use in integrated DDR processes made up of various combinations of DDR programmes and DDR-related tools, as well as in reintegration support in the absence of a DDR programme. DDR-related tools include, but are not limited to: Pre-DDR, Community Violence Reduction (CVR), transitional WAM and DDR support to mediation or transitional security arrangements. This SOP provides detail for the safe and secure management of weapons and ammunition received as a result of any of these activities.
10. This SOP does not address issues related to weapons and ammunition owned by Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs), Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE), UN-owned equipment (UNOE) or weapons and ammunition seized and/or recovered by the UN Force or other mission entity. These areas are covered by the United Nations Policy on Weapons and Ammunition Management (2019.03), the United Nations Manual on Ammunition Management (2019.27), the SOP on Loss of Weapons and Ammunition in Peace Operations (2019.04) and the Manual on Policies and Procedures concerning the Reimbursement of T/PCCs Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (A/75/121).

C. POLICY

11. The SOP should comply with national laws and international obligations of the country where the activities are being implemented. There are numerous international, regional and sub-regional instruments governing the safety and security of weapons, ammunition and explosives. It is the responsibility of national governments to develop national legislation and regulations conforming to global, regional and sub-regional commitments.

12. The SOP should comply with international standards and guidelines. Two sets of international guidelines have been developed with respect to weapons and ammunition management. The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) provide guidance with respect to safe and secure ammunition management. The Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) provides practical guidance on all aspects of small arms and light weapons (SALW) control, including legislation, programme design and operational support.

13. Policy relating to integrated DDR processes is provided by the IDDRS, which are also referenced in this SOP. The modules of particular relevance include IDDRS 4.10 ("Disarmament") and 4.11 ("Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management"). Further, the UN Policy on WAM provides a "conceptual and operational framework to ensure the effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of UN weapons, weapons-related equipment and ammunition management, to ensure safety, security and accountability. Further guidance on WAM for DDR practitioners is provided in the Handbook on "Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing DDR Context."

D. PROCEDURES

14. All UN missions involved in WAM activities in DDR processes should establish standard operating procedures on disarmament operations and transitional WAM activities based on the process outlined in this SOP. The following procedures provide a template for WAM activities by UN Missions as part of DDR processes. They cannot address every eventuality, and it is important that technically qualified and authorized personnel are included in all Missions to provide guidance and interpretation. This is particularly important in relation to the management of ammunition and explosives, which is highly dangerous for unqualified and untrained personnel. The procedures in this SOP must be applied unless specific variances and/or exemptions are authorized in writing by the Mission leadership, having considered all appropriate technical advice, which may be provided by the Weapons and Ammunition Advisory Board (WAAB). The WAAB shall be established in UN Missions to provide WAM advice to the Mission Senior Leadership, as stipulated in the UN WAM Policy.

15. This SOP shall be used as a template to develop individual Mission-specific SOPs on WAM in DDR processes. The Mission-specific SOPs should refer to and be consistent with any other WAM SOPs adopted by the Mission and/or national authorities. The development of the SOP on WAM in DDR processes shall be led by the DDR section with the support of a small group of technical experts, including the WAM Advisor as well as representation from the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the Force and Military Observers (MILOBs) depending on availability and expertise within the Mission. The Mission WAM SOPs should identify the precise responsibilities of the various UN components involved in WAM activities for each procedure (e.g., DDR officers, the Force, UNMAS and MILOBs). It is the responsibility of the Mission entity tasked with a specific function to ensure that those personnel given technical responsibilities, including safety and security of weapons and ammunition, have the necessary competences and receive authorization, when required, from the Mission senior leadership.

16. Disarmament operations and transitional WAM activities are to be undertaken in accordance with the principles of non-discrimination and fair and equitable treatment; gender equality; and respect for human rights. No special status or treatment shall be given to any group, and no individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of

gender, age, race, ethnicity, colour, religion, nationality, political or other opinion, or other personal characteristics or associations. In line with the women, peace and security agenda, all disarmament and transitional WAM initiatives must integrate gender and age considerations, including the differing impacts on women, men, boys and girls and their perceptions of weapons, ammunition and explosives. Such an approach requires gender expertise, gender analysis and the collection of sex- and age-disaggregated data. DDR practitioners shall ensure that both men and women are involved in disarmament operations and transitional WAM activities. To avoid perpetuating gender inequalities, practitioners should take a gender-responsive approach to every phase of a DDR process, from design to implementation to monitoring of all activities.

17. DDR processes are often conducted in contexts where the majority of combatants are youth. In line with the youth, peace and security agenda, youth should be involved in all stages of planning, implementation and monitoring of DDR WAM activities. Specific attention should also be given to the needs of youth when designing and implementing disarmament operations and transitional WAM activities.

18. The range of disposal options to be considered for weapons and ammunition may vary between missions. However, it is generally considered a good practice to destroy all weapons and ammunition received during a DDR process. This is particularly pertinent for ammunition and explosives, which may have been stored in poor conditions (e.g., extreme temperature or humidity) with a potential negative impact on safety. Before weapons and ammunition are destroyed, consideration should be given to whether they have been used in criminal activity and/or are the subject of a UN sanctions regime, in which case they should be retained until completion of any investigation.

D1. Reception of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives in Static or Mobile Disarmament

19. For safety and security reasons, DDR practitioners should only handle weapons and ammunition if they have received appropriate training and are authorized to do so by the UN Mission senior leadership. Whenever possible, the disarming of former combatants and the reception of weapons and ammunition should be undertaken by MILOBS or members of the UN Force under the guidance of DDR personnel. WAM Advisors and UNMAS staff may be requested to supervise the receipt of ammunition. Depending on the provisions of the ceasefire and/or peace agreement and the national DDR policy document, commanders of armed groups may also be part of the disarmament team. Details on the implementation of disarmament and transitional WAM can be found in IDDRS 4.10 and 4.11 respectively.

20. All personnel involved in the DDR process are to be aware that the decision by combatants to surrender their arms can be extremely difficult, and individuals may be under high degrees of stress. DDR personnel shall exercise caution in their interactions with combatants, but treat them with firmness, fairness and respect in order to reduce stress and the risk of confrontation as much as possible. In this regard, the specific needs of youth should be considered.

21. Whether disarmament takes place at a static site specifically constructed for the task; at a remote site where spontaneous or short-term disarmament opportunities may be exploited; or at mobile sites established for a short period of time, the below procedure should be followed as closely as possible. Variations to account for local conditions may be made, subject to approval by the senior DDR representative at the UN Mission HQ.

22. Separate disarmament sites shall be established for different armed forces and groups in order to minimize the possibility of violence during the disarmament process. Separation of different factions may be challenging due to geographical, logistical and administrative issues, in which case a security risk assessment (SRA) shall be undertaken to determine whether alternative mitigation measures can be put in place.

23. Planning and Establishing the Disarmament Site

a) Composition of a Disarmament Team. The disarmament team should be gender balanced and comprise the following:

(1) DDR practitioners.

(2) A national DDR Commission representative.

(3) A technical support team including: A WAM Advisor[1]/Team Leader; WAM/ Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) specialist(s) (International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) EOD Level 3) to identify and manage reception of ammunition and explosives; weapons inspector(s) to identify and assess safety of weapons and equipment; registration/accounting officer(s) to maintain records of all items received; storage personnel to manage safe storage and secure of items received; and medical support.

(4) UN Military Observers (MILOBS) and representatives of the protection force.

(5) UN Police Force (UNPOL) representatives.

(6) Representatives of the national security forces (police, army and/or gendarmerie).

(7) A representative of the Mission human rights/child protection staff.

(8) A national youth specialist.

(9) A national gender specialist.

(10) A representative of the affiliated armed group(s) may be included

(11) Local language interpreters, if required.

b) Security: at the disarmament site requires a collective effort by all Mission personnel. The DDR section should ensure that representatives of the UN Force and UNPOL are involved in the planning so that there is a complete understanding by all elements of their roles when DDR activities are undertaken. The presence of elements of the UN Force and/or UNPOL shall be requested in order to secure the site and provide security for UN personnel engaged in the activity. They will also provide assurance to the disarming combatants that their personal safety and security from retaliatory actions by opposing armed forces and groups will be granted by the UN once they disarm.

c) Layout of the site: The exact layout of the site will depend on geographical considerations and the amount of available space. The layout should be planned to provide easy access by combatants, as well as security for the staff operating the site and for the surrounding local population. Separate collection and storage areas should be established within the site for weapons and for ammunition.

[1] The role of the WAM Advisor is detailed in the WAM Handbook (Unit 1, Box 1).

The following principles should be considered when constructing a disarmament site:

(1) The site must provide a secure area for the disarmament team to operate. This should include adequate fencing and barriers. In remote or mobile sites, security may rely solely upon the presence of force protection elements provided by the UN Force and UNPOL. Additional support may be provided by the national security forces, subject to a SRA.

(2) As close as possible to the entrance, a loading and unloading bay shall be constructed to promote safe handling of weapons.

(3) There shall be suitable working areas for the DDR practitioners, providing protection from the local climate. The nature and construction of the site will be determined by the anticipated duration of its operation.

(4) Where possible, there should be shelter provided for members of the armed forces and groups waiting for and passing through the disarmament process. Drinking water should be made available.

(5) A first aid/medical support area should be included in the site layout. Adequate casualty evacuation arrangements should be considered, including the potential siting of a suitable helicopter landing site if deemed necessary.

(6) Secure storage shall be provided for weapons handed over by members of armed forces and groups. For mobile and remote sites, consideration should be given to how the recovered items will be transported to the permanent storage location pending disposal. Use of ISO containers may be appropriate; the number required should be calculated using the estimated quantity of weapons to be collected.

(7) Safe and secure storage shall be provided for ammunition and explosives handed over by members of armed forces and groups. Small Arms Ammunition (SAA) of Hazard Division (HD) 1.4 may be stored no less than 100 meters from working and/or accommodation sites. Ammunition and explosives of other HDs should be stored according to the hazard and quantity received (see procedure E4 below). The WAM advisor shall identify the location and any protective measures that may be required.

(8) A demolition/burning area shall be identified at a safe distance from all other activities, for the destruction of any ammunition or explosive items that are assessed to be unsafe for storage or transportation. Environmental considerations should considered in the identification of the area to minimise negative ramifications for the surrounding civilian population or infrastructure. The WAM advisor will specify the location for this area, based upon the principles contained in Annex D of IATG 10.10.

(9) In line with the “do no harm” principle, due consideration should be given to the security and protection concerns of local communities in areas where disarmament sites are established. In this regard, Missions should develop local protection plans to address risks associated with/arising from the establishment of a disarmament site.

d) Communications with the local community and armed forces and groups: The plan for how the disarmament site will be operated shall be communicated to armed forces and groups and the local community. Support should be sought from the

UNPOL to facilitate community engagement prior to establishment of sites, anticipate and defuse possible tensions and relay key DDR-relevant messages. The communications plan should include assurance to all concerned of the measures in place for the safety and security of the community, of the site and all materiel recovered during the disarmament process. DDR practitioners and other members of the team should be aware of the sensitivities related to the presence of members of national security forces around the disarmament site and address this issue as part of their communication with local communities and armed forces and groups. The communications plan shall be gender-responsive and take local cultures and norms into account.

24. Before members of armed forces and groups enter the site

a) Combatants should be treated with respect and courtesy when arriving at a holding area adjacent to the disarmament site. Firm and fair dealings with combatants can help build trust at a difficult and stressful time. A briefing on the disarmament process should be delivered to the combatants and the disarmament task should be carried out as swiftly as possible, commensurate with safety and security. Members of armed forces and groups should then be invited to commence the disarmament process one by one.

b) Each individual entering the disarmament process should be identified at the verification desk by his/her commander, and his/her identity shall be checked by designated security officials. Identity records should be maintained by the DDR officers on site in order to pre-screen the combatants for further demobilization and reintegration activities.

c) Female security officials and child protection staff shall be available to support identity checks if women or children (i.e., individuals under 18) in the armed forces and groups are entering the disarmament process.\

d) When children enter the DDR process, the guiding principles from the Convention on the Rights of the Child are to be applied. These are: the child's right to life, survival and development; non-discrimination; participation and free expression; and action in the child's best interest. Therefore, special measures shall be implemented for children/under-age members. Children with weapons should be disarmed, but should not be required to demonstrate their familiarity with a weapon or their capacity to use it. Children should be supervised closely by qualified child protection staff throughout the disarmament process. Further information on this aspect of the process can be found in IDDRS 5.30 on "Children and DDR".

e) Any individual who is carrying ammunition or explosives that may present a threat (e.g., explosives that pose safety concerns) should be required to leave those items in a location designated and prepared by the WAM/EOD specialist for inspection and, if required, disposal.

f) Individuals shall be directed to enter the disarmament site with their weapons pointing to the ground, safety catch in the "safe" position and with fingers away from the trigger/firing mechanism.

25. On entering the disarmament site

a) Individuals shall be directed to the designated and prepared loading/unloading bay. Under supervision of a qualified personnel (e.g., MILOBS) the individual shall carry out a full unloading procedure for their weapon(s) and show that they are clear.

b) Once cleared, the weapon shall be handed over to the qualified person who will proceed with verification.

c) If the individual is in possession of SAA, it should be placed in an identified location away from where the weapons are being processed.

d) The details of each individual and all weapons and ammunition that they hand over shall be recorded by a DDR practitioner, with safety guidance and identification provided by the weapons and ammunition specialists.

e) The DDR practitioner shall provide the individual with a receipt, countersigned by the representative of the national DDR commission, that includes:

   (1) Name of individual handing over the weapons and/or ammunition

   (2) Date and location

   (3) Make and type of weapon, including calibre

   (4) Status of weapon (serviceable/unserviceable)[2]

   (5) Weapon serial number

   (6) Where applicable, type and quantity of ammunition handed over

f) The DDR practitioner shall secure a serial numbered tag to the weapon, including weapon serial number, date and location received. The tag is likely to be handwritten, but it may use a barcode if suitable technology is available. The tag is a vital component to facilitate accounting and record-keeping of the weapon during storage and transportation, until ultimate disposal. Weapons shall be handled in accordance with procedure D3.

g) Weapons and ammunition shall be separately stored and transported under the instructions of the WAM advisor. Any ammunition or explosives presenting an immediate risk or deemed unsafe for transportation shall be destroyed in situ (at the identified demolition/burning area) by a qualified EOD specialist. Ammunition and explosives shall be handled in accordance with procedure D4

26. Special considerations for transitional WAM: Transitional WAM may be considered when the full conditions for DDR are not present. It should be undertaken as part of a broader DDR strategy with the aim of removing or facilitating the legal registration of weapons to limit the quantity that may be used in violent activities. This may be done as part of a CVR process. It must be done against the essential background of building community trust and ensuring that the UN's reputation is not tarnished in any way. The procedures detailed above may therefore have to be tailored to the specific situation of transitional WAM, but the fundamental principles of safety shall be applied. The full cycle of transitional WAM should be transparent and accountable from collection through to disposal. Once weapons and ammunition are voluntarily submitted in a transitional WAM process, their security is paramount to ensuring that they are not diverted, potentially compromising the UN's authority. Ideally, weapons and ammunition collected as part of a CVR programme should be destroyed. Further information on the receipt, storage and disposal of weapons and ammunition received as part of transitional WAM and CVR processes is provided in IDDRS 4.11.

[2] What is considered a serviceable or unserviceable weapon should be defined in the individual Mission SOPs on WAM.

Technical Guidance – Reception of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives in Static or Mobile Disarmament
IDDRS 04.10 “Disarmament”
IDDRS 04.11 “Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management”
IDDRS 5.10 “Women, Gender and DDR”
IDDRS 5.30 “Children and DDR”
MOSAIC 02.10 “SALW control in the context of DDR”
MOSAIC 05.30 “Marking and Record Keeping”
MOSAIC 05.40 “Collection of illicit and unwanted SALW”
IATG 10.10 “Demilitarization and Destruction of Conventional Ammunition”
UN WAM Policy

D2. Compliance with Weapons- and Ammunition-Related Eligibility Criteria

27. Prior to the start of disarmament operations, a weapons survey should have taken place to identify the principal types of weapons in use with the armed forces and groups to be disarmed and used as the basis of a recognition guide for those receiving the weapons. Using the results of this survey, the key stakeholders should determine eligibility criteria for the receipt of weapons and ammunition. This is important for properly training and briefing disarmament staff and for providing appropriate, safe and secure facilities.

28. In most cases, the type of weapons handed over will be SALW. These are weapons systems that are generally defined as operated by an individual or a small crew. This category includes, inter alia:

a) Short-barrelled handguns

b) Long-barrelled weapons, such as carbines, semi-automatic rifles and assault weapons

c) Sub-machine guns

d) Light and heavy machine guns

e) Portable, or rifle-attachable, grenade launchers

f) Portable anti-aircraft guns and portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile and rocket systems

g) Portable anti-tank guns and portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems

h) Mortars of a calibre less than 100 millimeters

29. The principles of the disarmament process remain the same for heavy weapons, such as larger-calibre mortars and artillery systems and their associated ammunition. However, the size of the weapons and the type and quantity of ammunition will determine wider logistical issues to be addressed as part of the disarmament plan.

30. To prevent proliferation, if a combatant wishes to hand over weapons or ammunition not included in the eligibility criteria, a member of the Disarmament Team Technical Support Team (e.g., the WAM Advisor or weapons inspector) should determine whether the weapon and/or ammunition is safe and, if so, whether to accept it for appropriate disposal. There may be administrative issues to resolve, but it is better that all weapons and ammunition offered for handover are removed from circulation, where they may cause danger to the community.

31. Weapons

a) On receipt of a weapon, a qualified person shall inspect the weapon to ensure it is safe to handle and to confirm that it meets the eligibility criteria for the disarmament process. Confirmation is required of the type of weapon and its serviceability. Considerations for serviceability include:

(1) Is the weapon complete, including all its working parts (e.g. breech block, firing pin, etc.)?

(2) Does the weapon appear to be well maintained? Is there corrosion inside the breech and/or barrel?

(3) If the weapon is currently unserviceable, could it easily be returned to a serviceable condition?

b) Following the initial inspection, a member of the DDR team should photograph the weapon. At least three photographs should be taken of each weapon to aid in identification and tracking. The photographs should show a complete view of each side of the weapon and a close-up of the serial number and other markings.[3]

c) Identification of SALW should be guided by MOSAIC 05.30. When a weapon cannot be adequately identified, it should be reported to the UN Force HQ with photographs and a full description.

d) Information for each weapon is to be recorded using the criteria listed in procedure D3. This information should be made available to DDR practitioners to facilitate checks against the disarmament eligibility criteria.

e) Unserviceable weapons should be identified, marked/tagged, registered and stored separately pending disposal.

32. **Ammunition and Explosives.**

a) On receipt of ammunition or explosives, an ammunition technical officer/technician shall inspect the ammunition to ensure that it is in a safe condition for handling, storage and transportation.

b) If safe to do so, the ammunition technical officer/technician should take photographs of the ammunition and explosives to aid in identification and tracing. At least two photographs should be taken of samples of each type of ammunition and explosives recovered. Photographs should be taken from the side and rear perspectives, showing any markings and engravings. It is not necessary to photograph every individual item of ammunition, but samples should be representative of each type and batch or lot. Photographs should be taken of a representative sample of

[3] See Annex 5 on documenting arms and ammunition, United Nations (2021) “Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing DDR Context”. Available from: www.un.org/disarmament/ddrhandbook-2ed.

ammunition and explosives in sealed boxes. Sealed boxes of ammunition and explosives shall not be opened except for inspection by ammunition technical personnel.

c) The quantity of ammunition handed over should be reported by (where identifiable) type, calibre, specific nature and batch/lot number.

d) Ammunition and explosives deemed unsafe shall be taken by qualified ammunition technical/EOD personnel to a safe location for disposal by demolition or burning.

e) Photographs and supporting documentation for weapons and ammunition should be saved onto electronic media. If appropriate and allowable, these data may be shared with relevant UN entities, including UNMAS, Arms Embargo Cells, UN Panels of Experts and Joint Mission Analysis Centres.

33. Data on weapons and ammunition should be protected in order to ensure the security of DDR practitioners and the stockpiles. Where the UN Mission mandate permits, it may be possible to share information with relevant UN entities investigating arms and ammunition deemed to be of potential significance in ongoing criminal investigations; suspected to be connected to an incident of terrorism, banditry or attacks against UN peacekeepers or UN staff, facilities or assets; or connected to violations of a UN Security Council embargo or sanctions regime. Such information should be carefully documented and maintained as evidence. Advice on ownership of this type of information should be obtained from the Legal Advisor. Ideally these data should be co-owned by the UN and the host State; however, in certain cases, sharing information about certain combatants or ex-combatants may put them at risk. Further guidance is provided in IDDRS 04.10.

34. Special considerations for transitional WAM and CVR: When CVR targets members of armed groups who are not formally eligible for a DDR programme, individual eligibility may be tied to the handover of serviceable weapons. Transitional WAM and potential CVR arms-related eligibility criteria should be set in line with the disarmament component of a DDR programme, if any, as well as other arms control initiatives running in the country.

Technical Guidance – Compliance with Weapons- and Ammunition-related Eligibility Criteria
IDDRS 04.10 “Disarmament”
MOSAIC 05.10 “Conducting SALW Surveys”
MOSAIC 05.31 “Tracing illicit SALW”

D3. Weapons Storage Management

35. As a fundamental principle, weapons and ammunition shall not be stored together. If constraints on available real estate make it necessary to store weapons and ammunition at the same site, they shall be stored and secured in separate buildings or containers.

36. The primary risk to be addressed when storing weapons is theft. Security is therefore key to managing weapons storage. Weapons shall be stored in secure buildings or containers, fitted with racks of suitable size to hold the types of weapon expected to be collected during disarmament and/or transitional WAM operations. Once placed in the

racks, the weapons shall be secured with chains or steel cables fitted with security padlocks.

37. At the point of collection, weapons shall be tagged with sufficient information to identify the weapon in the weapons account. At a minimum, each tag should include a unique reference number as well as the serial number of the weapon. If possible, the handwritten tag should be replaced by a metal tag with the unique reference number or by a barcode tag, firmly affixed to the weapon.

38. Prior to placing a weapon in storage, DDR practitioners should record its full details and enter them into the appropriate accounting system. This system may be a properly integrated Information Management System (IMS) or a simple database or spreadsheet. Further information on recording and accounting for weapons is included in the WAM Handbook.

    The following information is to be recorded for all recovered weapons:

    a) Make/Type
    b) Model
    c) Calibre
    d) Serial number
    e) Country of manufacture (or most recent import if the weapon bears an import mark)
    f) Year of manufacture
    g) Other markings
    h) Name or IMS number of combatant
    i) Armed group of origin (if relevant)
    j) Location and date of collection
    k) Storage code or location
    l) DDR tag number
    m) Transfers (dates, new custodian)
    n) Destruction (date, location, method, entities who conducted and verified destruction)

39. Once the weapon has been tagged and all information has been recorded, the weapon shall be placed and secured in a storage building or container. Should the SRA suggest that the stored weapons are at risk of theft or diversion, provisions shall be made for their deactivation through the removal of breech bolts, handgun slides or essential parts of the firing mechanisms. These removed parts should be stored separately, possibly at another location, and tagged with references to the weapon to which they belong.

40. Accounting for weapons should be carried out in accordance with procedure D5. The accounts shall be updated whenever a weapon or consignment of weapons is moved between storage sites, until final disposal.

41. Stock checks are an important element of weapons storage management. The person responsible for the weapons storage facility shall ensure that these stock checks are undertaken. For additional security and good practice, the person actually conducting the stock check should not have any direct responsibility for accounting for the weapons being held.

Stock checks are to be carried out as follows:

a) Every week, a physical stock check of the quantity and types of weapons shall take place in all weapons storage facilities. In addition, a minimum of 10 percent of weapons held are to be checked by serial number against the DDR database record.

b) At least once every six months, a 100 percent stock check by type and serial number is to take place.

c) Records of all stock checks are to be kept for audit purposes.

42. No person shall have sole access to either the weapons and ammunition stores. There shall be at least two people present when accessing the weapons store and a dual-lock system shall be implemented to ensure that individual access is not possible. A logbook is to be kept at the entry to the weapons store to record by whom, when and why the weapons store has been accessed. In the event of a loss of weapons this will be used to inform the investigation.

43. Facilities to be used for the storage of weapons and ammunition should be the subject of a full Security Risk Assessment. If the SRA classifies them as "Critical Installations", they shall be included in the security patrolling plans for the UN Force and/or UNPOL.

Technical Guidance – Weapons Storage Management
IDDRS 04.10 "Disarmament"
MOSAIC 05.20 "Stockpile Management: Weapons"
Effective WAM in a Changing DDR Context ("WAM Handbook")

D4. Ammunition and Explosives Storage Management

44. As a fundamental principle, weapons and ammunition shall not be stored together. If constraints on available real estate make it necessary to store weapons and ammunition at the same site, they shall be stored and secured in separate buildings or containers. Ammunition and explosives storage should be managed in accordance with the principles of the IATG, with technical advice and direction provided by the Senior Ammunition Technical Officer (SATO) for the Mission.

45. Storing ammunition and explosives results in inherent safety concerns and security requirements. Ammunition and explosives other than HD 1.4[4] (including SAA) require special considerations for storage, as well as personnel with additional competences, to manage the storage facility and operation.

46. All recovered ammunition shall be stored in an appropriate storage facility by quantity, HD and Compatibility Group (CG), in accordance with the Aggregation and CG Mixing Rules. The facility shall be planned, constructed and managed in accordance with the Risk Reduction Process Levels (RRPLs) described in IATG 01.20. Due to the nature of disarmament operations and transitional WAM activities, long-term ammunition storage

[4] HD 1.4 ammunition is defined as "Ammunition that presents No Significant Hazard." This does not mean that it presents NO hazard. (IATG 01.50 section 6.1 Table 1)

is unlikely to be required. The facility and its operations shall meet the requirements of RRPL 1 and, whenever possible those of RRPL 2.

RRPL 1 is characterized by these conditions:

a) Basic safety precautions are in place to reduce the risk of undesirable explosive events during ammunition storage, but fatalities and injuries to individuals in local civilian communities may still occur.

b) Although some potential causes of such explosions have been addressed (external fires, smoking, mobile phones etc.), others remain (propellant instability, handling, lightning strike).

c) Risk of explosion still remains as routine physical inspection of the ammunition does not occur and the capability to determine the chemical stability of ammunition during storage has not been acquired.

d) Basic security precautions are in place to reduce the risk of theft by external actions.

e) Basic safety precautions, in the form of appropriate Quantity Distances, have been implemented to mitigate the risk of fatalities and injuries to individuals within local communities to a tolerable level.

f) Ammunition has been accounted for by quantity, and a basic system of identifying loss or theft is in place.

g) A minimal investment of resources has taken place in organisational development, operating procedures and storage infrastructure.

47. A demolition and burning area is required at all ammunition storage facilities to facilitate urgent disposal of unsafe ammunition.

48. Ammunition collected is unlikely to have been stored in optimal storage conditions. Exposure to high temperatures, diurnal cycling and/or high humidity have the effect of accelerating the deterioration of ammunition and rendering it potentially unsafe. All recovered ammunition should be inspected by qualified ammunition technical staff to determine its safety for storage pending final disposal, which should take place without undue delay. Any ammunition that is visibly unsafe shall be disposed of at the earliest opportunity by detonation or burning.

49. All ammunition shall be accounted for. Before ammunition and explosives are stored, DDR practitioners should record their full details and enter them into the appropriate accounting system. This system may be a properly integrated IMS or a simple database or spreadsheet.

The following information is to be recorded for all recovered ammunition and explosives, including any that is deemed unsafe and designated for immediate destruction:

a) Category

b) Type

c) Quantity

d) Calibre (if applicable)

e) Headstamp (when relevant)

f) Lot and batch number (if mixed lots/batches are collected, specify quantity of each)

g) Manufacturer

h) Country of origin

i) Condition

j) Expiration Date[5] (if known)

k) Name or IMS number of combatant armed group of origin

l) Date of collection

m) Location of collection

n) Storage code or location

o) Transfers (dates, new custodian)

p) Destruction (date, location, method, entities who conducted and verified destruction)

50. Accounting for ammunition and explosives should be carried out in accordance with procedure D5. The accounts shall be updated whenever a consignment of ammunition and explosives is moved between storage sites, until final disposal.

51. Stock checks are an important element of ammunition and explosives storage management. Stock-checks are to be carried out as follows:

a) A physical stock-check by quantity and type of ammunition is to be undertaken weekly.

b) Records of all stock-checks are to be kept for audit purposes.

52. Due to the safety issues inherent to ammunition and explosives, the requirements for ammunition and explosives storage facilities are extensive. IATG Volume 04 – "Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Temporary Conditions)" and Volume 05 – "Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Infrastructure and Equipment)" detail what is required to store ammunition and explosives. The requirements are complex, and the WAM Advisor shall provide the necessary advice and detail to plan and implement safe and secure ammunition storage.

Several principal considerations are briefly outlined below:

a) Security: No individual shall be able to gain sole access to an ammunition or explosives storehouse. At least two people shall be present when accessing the storehouse. A logbook is to be kept at the entry to the storage area recording who, when and why people have accessed the storage area and any individual storehouse. If a loss of ammunition or explosives occurs, the logbook will be used to inform the investigation.

b) Potential explosion sites, quantity distances and explosive limit licensing: Each individual location used to store ammunition and explosives is known as a potential explosion site (PES). They must meet certain requirements specific to the type of structure, and they must apply other protective measures to reduce the hazards of storing ammunition or explosives. At the basic level, the type and quantity of ammunition and explosives that a may be stored at a location are limited to those authorized on its explosives limit licence (ELL). The ELL will also include safe separation distances, known as quantity distances (QDs), to be applied between

[5] Various Ammunition Life Expiration Dates may be used. Most important is "Safe Life Expiry Date" if identifiable.

PES and between a PES and an exposed site (ES) used for non-explosives activities. It is critical to the safety of UN DDR practitioners and the local population that the requirements for the PES, ELL and QDs are respected and applied.

c) Fire safety: The risk of fire in an explosives area is significant and shall be reduced to a level as low as reasonably practicable.

(1) All personnel shall do all in their power to prevent fire in an explosives storage area.

(2) In the event of a fire, all non-essential personnel should immediately evacuate to a pre-determined, safe distance.

(3) First aid fire-fighting equipment (e.g., fire extinguishers, fire beaters, water and/or sand buckets, etc.) should be placed at regular points around the explosives area. These are to control the spread of fire, but if the fire spreads to a site containing explosives, all personnel shall retire as quickly as possible to a pre-determined safe location.

Fires involving explosives should not be fought.

(4) Fire safety measures are detailed in IATG 02.50, "Fire Safety".

d) Thunderstorms: Electrostatic lighting discharges involved in thunderstorms pose both a fire threat and a direct threat of initiating electro-explosive devices. Adequate and appropriate lightning protection should be provided in all explosives storage facilities

Technical Guidance – Ammunition and Explosives Storage Management
IDDRS 04.10 "Disarmament"
IATG 01.50 "UN Explosive Hazard Classification System and Codes"
IATG 02.10 "Introduction to Risk Management Principles and Processes"
IATG 02.50 "Fire Safety"
IATG 03.10 "Inventory Management"
IATG Volume 04 – "Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Field and Temporary Conditions)"
IATG 04.20 "Temporary Storage"
IATG Volume 05 – "Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Infrastructure and Equipment)"
IATG 09.10 "Security"

D5. Accounting for Weapons and Ammunition

53. Accurate accounting is critical to the credibility of DDR processes. The DDR section must be able to demonstrate that weapons and ammunition received can all be accounted for from the moment of receipt until the point of final disposal. Record-keeping facilitates effective management of materiel; ensures transparency; enables monitoring; and prevents diversion.

54. The DDR section should implement an IMS appropriate to the infrastructure available within the area of operations. The ideal is a fully networked system that will immediately

update records as new data are entered; in many cases, however, this will not be possible. Such cases may require a more basic system that incorporates both handwritten records and accounts held in a basic form of database or in simple computer spreadsheets.

55. In all cases, the accounting system should provide sufficient information to allow precise identification and tracking of the movement of materiel from the collection point to disposal.

56. Weapons

The information recorded for weapons received during DDR operations is detailed in procedure D3. If the IMS is fully networked, the entry of a new weapons record should be automatically shared throughout the DDR section. In many cases the weapons account will not be held on a networked system, so alternative reporting methods are necessary to maintain an accurate record of the quantities and types of weapons held.

The accounting system should:

a) Record all weapons in a simple database or spreadsheet, including all criteria listed in procedure D3.

b) Provide a daily report on the quantity of weapons held by type and status (i.e., serviceable or unserviceable), to be submitted to the DDR section at the Mission HQ. This report should be submitted by electronic means as a database report or spreadsheet summary, but it may be submitted verbally by radio or telephone if other means are unavailable.

c) Provide a weekly report to be submitted to the DDR section on the quantity of weapons held by type and status, including a list of weapon serial numbers. The report should include quantities of weapons received, quantities on hand and quantities issued, whether to more permanent storage or for disposal. This report should be submitted electronically, but if no network capability is available, it should be copied onto removable media (e.g., a USB stick or CD-ROM) and transported to the DDR section.

d) Use an agreed reporting timetable, which should be included in the Mission DDR plan. Suggested timings are:

(1) Daily Report: Weapons State reported as at 08:30 local time; to be received by DDR section no later than 12:30 local time.

(2) Weekly Report: Weapons Account reported as at 08:30 local time each Wednesday; to be received by DDR section within 24 hours of preparation.

57. Ammunition

Ammunition accounts must be accurately maintained for both safety and security purposes. Ammunition and explosives deteriorate with age, a process which can be accelerated by environmental conditions such as high temperature and/or humidity. The information to be recorded on ammunition received during DDR processes is detailed in procedure D4. In addition, any known or assessed information regarding storage conditions and environmental exposure should be included. If the IMS is fully networked, the entry of new quantities of ammunition received should be automatically shared throughout the DDR section. However, because the ammunition account is often not held on a networked system, alternative reporting methods are necessary to maintain an accurate record of the quantities and types of ammunition and explosives held.

The accounting system should:

a) Record all ammunition and explosives in a simple database or spreadsheet, including all criteria listed in procedure E4.

b) Provide a daily report of quantity of ammunition and explosives held by type, which should be submitted to DDR section at the Mission HQ. This report should be submitted by electronic means as a database report or spreadsheet summary is possible, but may be submitted verbally by radio or telephone if other means are unavailable.

c) Provide a weekly report to be submitted to DDR section of quantity of ammunition and explosives held by type, including Lot/Batch number, and condition (i.e. an indication of the assessed safety for storage and transportation). If any man-portable missiles or rockets have been received, these should be reported by serial number. The report should include quantities of ammunition and explosives received, quantities on hand and quantities issued, whether to more permanent storage or for disposal. This report should be submitted in electronic form. If no networked capability is available, the accounting report should be copied onto removable media, e.g. USB stick or CD-ROM, and transported to the DDR section.

d) Use an agreed reporting timetable, which should be included in the Mission DDR plan. Suggested timings are:

e) Daily Report: Ammunition State reported as at 08:30 local time; to be received by DDR section no later than 12:30 local time.

f) Weekly Report: Ammunition Account report as at 08:30 local time each Wednesday; to be received by DDR section within 24 hours of preparation.

58. Weapons and ammunition accounting data may be of value to armed forces and groups not involved in the DDR process or to dissident factions within participating groups. Therefore, the accounting data should be subject to appropriate security controls, including use of secure computer systems and password protection of the accounts, in whatever form they are held.

Technical Guidance – Accounting for Weapons and Ammunition
IDDRS 04.10 “Disarmament”
MOSAIC 05.30 “Marking and Recordkeeping”
IATG 03 Volume “Ammunition Accounting”

D6. Transportation of Weapons

59. Transportation of weapons is principally a security consideration, as there are no direct safety considerations. Diversion of weapons may be a major security concern in some circumstances, so practitioners should carefully plan any movement of weapons, including transportation for final destruction. Consideration should be given to disposal of weapons at the point of collection to reduce the risk of diversion.

60. A full risk assessment shall be undertaken prior to any large-scale movement of weapons. Transport routes should be planned and checked in advance, and details of

the route and timings for the move shall be treated as confidential. If regular movement of weapons occurs between two identified locations, consideration shall be given to varying the routes and timings to avoid creating identifiable movement patterns. Security of transportation should be ensured by the UN Force military component or by national security forces or by designated security officials.

61. Handover/takeover protocols and documentation shall be agreed prior to any transportation of weapons. These protocols are to be strictly followed in order to ensure a continuous audit trail for custody of the weapons.

62. Weapons shall not be transported in the same vehicle as the ammunition used in the weapon. If possible, weapons and their ammunition should not be transported in vehicles travelling together.

63. Preparation

a) Prior to transportation, an armourer or other qualified weapons specialist should inspect the weapons and ensure that the working parts and magazine (where applicable) have been removed.

b) The weapons should be secured in suitable containers for transportation and magazines. Working parts should be secured in separate containers.

c) The person responsible for moving the weapons should:

(1) Ensure that the correct documentation for transporting the weapons has been prepared.

(2) Ensure that suitable physical security procedures have been put in place, including the separation of working parts and magazines from the weapons body and the security of the containers in which the weapons will be moved.

(3) Confirm that the vehicle is suitable for the move and that an appropriate route has been selected.

(4) Confirm that the organization/location to which the weapons are to be moved has been informed and has agreed to accept the consignment.

64. Loading and during transportation

a) Ensure that weapons are loaded onto separate vehicles from their associated working parts.

b) Ensure that the vehicles are secured to the greatest possible extent. Ideally, this should be through use of containerized vehicles that can be locked with suitable padlocks. Where this is not possible, a guard may be required to travel with the consignment or in an accompanying vehicle within eyeshot of the weapons-carrying vehicle to ensure that unauthorized personnel cannot gain access.

c) Ensure that the correct documentation has been prepared and provided to the person nominated as responsible for the consignment and drivers of the vehicles carrying the weapons.

65. On arrival

a) On arrival at the destination, the consignee shall carry out a 100 percent check of weapons received against the documentation accompanying the consignment. Any discrepancies shall be notified to the consignor and an investigation initiated.

b) All weapons shall be unloaded as soon as possible after arrival and shall be placed in secure storage, pending further storage or destruction.

Technical Guidance – Transportation of Weapons
MOSAIC 05.20 “Stockpile Management: Weapons”

D7. Transportation of Ammunition and Explosives

66. The transportation of dangerous goods, which include ammunition and explosives, should be regulated to minimize the risk of accidents that might cause death or injury to people or animals and/or damage to property, equipment or the environment. The UN has developed mechanisms for harmonizing hazard criteria during transport and safe transport conditions. Transportation of ammunition and explosives may be by road, rail, air or sea and there are accepted international agreements that relate to the transportation by each of these modes. Detailed guidance on transporting ammunition and explosives is contained in IATG 08.10.

67. All movement of ammunition and explosives on UN Missions shall be undertaken in accordance with IATG 08.10, “Transport of Ammunition”. Where the operational circumstances or local conditions make it difficult to comply with the guidance provided in IATG 08.10, a qualitative risk assessment is to be undertaken by ammunition technical staff and the risk accepted and authorized by senior UN leadership, or another nominated and empowered individual.

68. These procedures cover the immediate movement of ammunition and explosives to an initial secure storage facility after they are handed over during disarmament operations or transitional WAM activities. They also cover any subsequent movement of the materiel deemed to be necessary. Mission-specific variations to these procedures may be authorized at the Mission/Force headquarters level following an appropriate risk assessment.

69. At all stages of transport, it is essential that the ammunition and explosives remain safe and secure. Any transfer of responsibility for ammunition and explosives from one individual or organization to another shall take place by a handover/takeover procedure, with the individual/organization receiving the ammunition and explosives signing to confirm receipt of and accept responsibility for them.

70. An adequate military and police escort shall be requested to avert the risk of diversion of weapons and/or ammunition in transport. UNPOL advice shall be sought to determine the level of potential risk on the itinerary and to engage with community leaders and other stakeholders in the areas along the transport route.

71. Ammunition packaging: It is likely that a large proportion of the ammunition handed over during disarmament operations and transitional WAM activities will not be in its original packaging. The WAM advisor shall ensure that the need for suitable ammunition packaging is included in the planning process. Unless ammunition and explosives can be packed in either their original packaging or another approved container, a qualified and authorized ammunition technical officer/technician shall inspect the re-packaged ammunition and use his/her technical expertise and judgement to determine whether the ammunition is safe for transportation. Requirements for ammunition packaging and marking are detailed in IATG 06.40.

72. Preparation

a) Prior to transportation, a technically qualified and authorized member of staff shall inspect the ammunition and explosives to confirm that they are safe to move. The inspection shall provide confirmation that:

(1) The ammunition and explosives are not showing any visible signs of deterioration.

(2) The ammunition and explosives are correctly packaged.

(3) The correct documentation, appropriate to the mode of transport, has been prepared.

(4) The vehicle, aircraft or vessel shall be suitable to carry ammunition and explosives, with fully trained and authorized crews and appropriate equipment for responding to any incident while in transit.

(5) The organization/location to which the ammunition and explosives are to be moved has been informed and has agreed to accept the consignment.

b) If the ammunition and explosives cannot be safely transported, they should be destroyed in situ. If this would cause unacceptable damage, it should be moved the minimum distance by EOD qualified staff to a safe location for destruction.

c) The person with responsibility for the movement of ammunition and explosives shall:

(1) Ensure that the transport has been correctly arranged, including obtaining confirmation that it is authorized for the movement of ammunition.

(2) Ensure that the crew of the vehicle, aircraft or vessel has the appropriate training and authority to undertake transportation of ammunition.

(3) Confirm that an appropriate route has been selected and that, where necessary, permission has been obtained for all sections of the journey.

(4) Plan the timing of the move such as to reduce the hazard to members of the public and to those undertaking the movement.

(5) Ensure that appropriate safety and security measures are in place to minimize the potential for incidents affecting the shipment.

73. Loading and during transportation

a) As ammunition and explosives are loaded onto the vehicle, aircraft or vessel, all current regulations concerning maximum Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ), aggregation rules and CG mixing rules shall be applied.

b) Once the ammunition and explosives have been loaded, their containers or pallets shall be properly and appropriately secured against movement. Where possible, the vehicle, railway carriage or container should be sealed for safety and security purposes.

c) For road and rail movements, the vehicle or railway carriage shall be marked with the correct placards to indicate the dangerous goods (DG) and their Hazard Classification Code (HCC).

d) During road movement of ammunition and explosives, suitable driver rest periods shall be incorporated to reduce the risk of road traffic accidents.

e) Adequate security arrangements shall be made to reduce the possibility of theft of ammunition and explosives, including potential armed attack on the vehicles. This should include escort vehicles and armed personnel when necessary. Where the host nation has an effective police or military security system, transportation security should be planned in conjunction with the local authorities.

74. <u>On arrival</u>

At the destination explosives storage area, the consignee shall:

a) Provide a safe and secure reception area, where the ammunition and explosives may be held pending formal receipt. The receipt of the ammunition and explosives shall not be unnecessarily delayed.

b) Check the consignment against the accompanying documentation. Any discrepancies shall be reported to the consignor and an investigation initiated.

c) If no discrepancies are identified, the ammunition and explosives shall be taken into account and placed in storage.

(1) Ammunition and explosives handed over during disarmament operations and transitional WAM activities should be isolated in storage until qualified technical staff can undertake a full technical inspection to confirm their safety for storage, pending a decision on disposal.

Technical Guidance – Transportation of Ammunition and Explosives
IATG 06.40 “Ammunition Packaging and Marking”
IATG 08.10 “Transportation of Ammunition”
IATG 09.10 “Security of Ammunition”
UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods – Model Regulations

D8. Storage Checks

75. Storage checks are required at regular intervals to confirm the safety and security of the storage facilities and their contents. The contents of weapons and ammunition stocks shall be checked regularly against the weapons and ammunition accounts in accordance with procedures D3, D4 and D5. These include daily counts, weekly stock checks by quantity and detailed biannual stock-taking.

76. Checks on the physical storage infrastructure are required to confirm its suitability for the task minimizing the potential for diversion of weapons and ammunition. For ammunition and explosives, storage checks are also intended to reduce the safety risks from external factors, which may cause or accelerate deterioration to a point where safety is compromised.

77. The exact storage checking requirement may vary between and even within Missions, depending on the physical infrastructure available at each specific storage location and the duration for which the ammunition and explosives are expected to be retained before final disposal.

78. <u>Buildings or containers used to store weapons</u>

a) Every morning, the locks and other security measures used to protect buildings or containers used to store weapons shall be checked to confirm that they remain secure. A further check shall be completed at the end of each working day to confirm that the building or container has been correctly secured.

b) Weapons storage buildings and containers shall be inspected each week for changes in their physical condition. These checks are to ensure that the infrastructure is sufficiently robust and not deteriorating to a point that their security or integrity may be compromised.

c) If a security alarm system is fitted to weapons stores, it should be tested on a weekly basis.

79. Ammunition storage facilities

Due to the safety issues inherent to storing ammunition and explosives, the storage check regime for ammunition storage facilities is extensive. IATG Volume 04, "Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Temporary Conditions)"; IATG Volume 05, "Explosives Facilities (Storage) (Infrastructure and Equipment)"; and IATG 06.70, "Inspection of Explosives Facilities", detail the requirements for infrastructure to store ammunition and explosives. These complex requirements provide the detail behind the storage checks listed, but they are not reproduced in this SOP.

a) Every morning the locks and other security measures used to control access to the explosives storage area and to protect buildings or containers used to store ammunition and explosives shall be checked to confirm that they remain secure. A further check shall be completed at the end of each working day to confirm that all buildings, containers and the explosives area itself have been correctly secured.

b) Ammunition and explosives storage areas shall be inspected for the physical condition of each storage location on a weekly basis. These checks are to ensure that the infrastructure is sufficiently robust and not deteriorating to a point at which their safety and security integrity is compromised.

c) If a security alarm system is fitted to ammunition stores, it should be tested on a weekly basis.

d) Fire alarm systems, electric or mechanical, should be tested on a weekly basis. Fire evacuation drills should be practised monthly.

e) A monthly check should be carried out on all PES to ensure that:

(1) The requirements of the explosive limit licence are being complied with.

(2) The ammunition and explosives held do not exceed the authorised quantity and that aggregation rules and CG mixing rules are being correctly applied.

(3) The infrastructure remains fit for purpose, including any protective barriers or traverses.

(4) All electrical fittings and other equipment used in the PES remain fit for purpose.

f) The Lightning Protection System (where fitted) should be tested at least once every 11 months.

80. Records: Records of all checks of weapons and ammunition storage facilities are to be maintained by the WAM supervisor for the site. Records of inspections are to be retained

for the duration of the UN Mission and for a minimum of five years following completion of the Mission. This enables routine safety and security audits and can also be used to inform investigations into loss, theft or accidents involving weapons and ammunition.

Technical Guidance – Storage Checks
MOSAIC 05.20 “Stockpile Management: Weapons”
IATG 03.10 “Inventory Management”

D9. Reporting and Investigating Loss or Theft

81. Any suspected loss or theft of weapons or ammunition shall be reported immediately to the Senior DDR Officer, who is to initiate an independent investigation. To ensure its independence, the investigation should be conducted by an individual or organization without any direct responsibility for the missing weapons or ammunition. This may include UNPOL or MILOBS with appropriate authority. The investigation should be thorough and report back to the Senior DDR Officer as soon as possible. The following information is required:

a) Weapons (for each individual weapon):
   (1) Make/type
   (2) Model
   (3) Calibre
   (4) Serial number
   (5) Country of manufacture (if known)

b) Ammunition and explosives:
   (1) Type (nature)
   (2) Quantity missing
   (3) Lot/batch information

c) Date, location and team/unit involved.

d) Summary of the circumstances of the loss, including how and when the loss was identified; when the weapon(s) and/or ammunition was last known to have been present; and any other relevant information.

e) Explanation of the loss, e.g. negligence, theft, accounting error etc. The investigating officer should provide an indication of the level of confidence in the explanation, i.e. beyond doubt, high confidence, assessment based on balance of probability, etc.

f) Disciplinary and/or criminal action taken to date. Further action may be deemed appropriate by the Senior DDR Officer following conclusion of the case.

g) Recommendations to prevent recurrence.

h) Date and location of recovery of the weapons and/or ammunition (if appropriate).

i) Summary of the circumstances of recovery (if appropriate).

Technical Guidance – Reporting and Investigation of Loss and Theft
IDDRS 04.10 “Disarmament”
MOSAIC 05.20 “Stockpile Management: Weapons”
IATG 09.10 “Security”

D10. Destruction of Weapons

82. The final disposal of weapons handed over during the DDR process is a critical part of the process. Where applicable, the disposal of weapons should be subject to a protocol agreed between the UN Mission and the national government. Disposal includes an important confidence-building and public relations element, demonstrating that the weapons surrendered by armed forces and groups have been properly taken out of circulation and cannot be diverted for future illicit use. Destruction shall be the preferred method of disposal, as it reduces the flow of arms in circulation, removes the risk of diversion and is more cost-effective than storage in accordance with international guidelines. National authorities may insist that serviceable materiel collected should be incorporated into national stockpiles (for further guidance, see IDDRS 4.10). Whichever disposal option is used, it must be safe, cost-effective and cause minimum environmental impact.

83. In order to reduce the flow of illicit arms, weapons shall be disposed of at the earliest viable opportunity. Before this process can take place, the weapons should have been correctly accounted for in accordance with procedure D5. Correctly identifying and recording weapons can help identify sources of illicit arms, and eliminating the sources may reduce the future flow of weapons into conflict zones.

84. Some preparatory work may be required prior to the final destruction process. For example, rifles may have wooden or plastic components (e.g., butt and stock) removed. This preparatory work should be undertaken by a qualified armourer and then reflected in accounts showing the status of the weapons. However, because such weapons are still potentially serviceable, they must remain subject to strict security and accounting controls.

85. Prior to destruction, weapons should be selected for disposal according to priorities determined by the DDR section in the UN Mission HQ.

a) Weapons shall be selected in suitable quantities that can be destroyed in a single destruction task.

b) Weapons shall be issued from storage for destruction. The issued weapons shall be accounted for by the serial number recorded on the approved issue voucher. The working parts of the weapon (e.g., breech block and firing pin) shall be issued along with the main body of the weapon for destruction, but these parts should be transported separately to the destruction location.

c) Appropriate security shall be provided to remove the possibility of diversion and to ensure that the destruction task is completed.

d) Following completion of the destruction task, the agency responsible shall complete a certificate of destruction, which shall be returned to the account holder at the unit

from which the weapons were issued, with a copy sent to the DDR section at the UN Mission HQ.

86. Approved destruction methods for weapons

a) Melting down all metal parts, where a suitable smelting facility is available.

b) Cutting into sections. The sections must be sufficiently small to ensure that they cannot be used to produce new weapons. This generally requires a minimum of three cuts. Cutting may be carried out using a bandsaw; a rotating disc; hydraulic shears; or an oxyacetylene or plasma torch.

(1) If the quantities of weapons for destruction are small, it may be easier and safer to take the cutting equipment to the weapons storage site.

(2) The scrap metal produced as a result of cutting weapons may be recycled for non-military purposes. A local or international contractor may be engaged to remove and recycle scrap metal. In these circumstances, the income received for the sale of scrap metal shall be properly accounted for by the DDR section and used to fund CVR programmes where appropriate.

c) Encasement in cement, followed by burial. This technique is simple and generally effective, but the costs of transportation and excavation may be significant. There is a marginal risk that the weapons could be recovered; however, returning them to a usable condition would be labour-intensive and time-consuming.

d) Other approved techniques may be used, but there are disadvantages for each. These may be used for symbolic purposes, as they are highly visible. However, they have significant disadvantages and require subsequent verification that the weapons have been rendered totally unusable and irreparable, so should not be used on a wide scale. These include:

(1) Burning.

(2) Crushing by tracked vehicles.

(3) Detonation.

87. Following the destruction of weapons, the WAM specialist carrying out the destruction task shall provide a certificate of destruction to confirm that all weapons have been destroyed. This certificate shall be submitted to the weapons account holder, who shall annotate the account accordingly. The certificate of destruction shall be kept with the weapons account for audit purposes.

Technical Guidance – Destruction of Weapons
IDDRS 04.10 “Disarmament”
MOSAIC 05.50 “Destruction: Weapons”

D11. Destruction of Ammunition and Explosives

88. Disposal of ammunition and explosives can be undertaken by various methods, which are outlined in IATG 10.10. In all circumstances, the selected demilitarization process should be the safest, most environmentally compliant and cost-effective method

available. In conflict or post-conflict situations where a DDR process is being implemented, infrastructure is often not available for industrial-scale demilitarization techniques. In such cases, more field-expedient methods may be required.

89. While incineration is an appropriate method for disposing of SAA, open burning or open detonation may be the principal options available for disposing of explosives and larger-calibre ammunition.

90. During the planning stage, all options for disposal should be considered. Where the national infrastructure does not support industrial demilitarization, consideration may be given to transporting ammunition and explosives out of the country, to a suitable facility with safer and/or more environmentally friendly capabilities. There are legislative, safety and practical issues that must be taken into consideration before such an option could be selected, and the environmental cost of movement may offset any potential environmental benefit of the industrial demilitarization process.

91. The remainder of this SOP assumes that disposal by methods other than industrial demilitarization are required.

92. If WAM specialists deem ammunition or explosives to be unsafe at any stage during their receipt, transportation or storage as part of a DDR process, the materiel is to be moved immediately to the closest demolition/burning area and destroyed by open burning or open detonation. If no authorized demolition/burning area has been established, the WAM specialist shall prepare a temporary area, with the necessary safety distances secured, to carry out an emergency demolition or burn. In cases where ammunition has been identified as unsafe to move and has been placed in the designated area (see D1, para. 19), it might become necessary to evacuate the site and dispose of this ammunition in situ without further movement.

93. Ammunition and explosives designated for destruction shall be inspected by WAM staff and cross-checked against the corresponding account. The ammunition and explosives shall be transported to the designated disposal site in accordance with the requirements of procedure D7 (unless the disposal site is adjacent to the storage site).

94. The WAM specialist will advise on the most appropriate destruction method for different types of ammunition and explosives. They shall be destroyed by one of the following methods:

    a) Incineration: This is appropriate for SAA and other items containing only small quantities of explosive material. Transportable incinerators are available, including filtration systems that can minimize the discharge of toxic gaseous products into the air. Collection and controlled disposal of residues from such incinerators can help minimize the environmental impact of the destruction process.

    b) Open burning: This is appropriate for large quantities of propellent and pyrotechnics and may also be used for some uncased high explosives. Burning takes place in the open air, and gaseous products of combustion and any residues after the burn may have an environmental impact.

    c) Open detonation: This is the appropriate method for cased high explosive ammunition and for any other ammunition and explosives that cannot be disposed of by other methods. The technique involves using calculated quantities of serviceable explosives to destroy the unwanted ammunition and explosives. Detonation takes place in the open air and gaseous products of detonation residues may have an environmental impact.

95. Following destruction of ammunition, the WAM/EOD specialist carrying out the destruction task shall provide a certificate of destruction to confirm that all ammunition and explosives have been destroyed. This certificate shall be submitted to the ammunition account holder at the UN Mission HQ, who shall annotate the ammunition account accordingly. The certificate of destruction shall be kept with the ammunition account for audit purposes.

Technical Guidance – Destruction of Ammunition and Explosives
IDDRS 04.10 “Disarmament”
IATG 10.10 “Demilitarization and Destruction of Conventional Ammunition”

D12. Managing Spontaneous Disarmament

96. In some circumstances, members of armed forces and groups may wish to disarm where a formal DDR process has not been established. Individuals wishing to disarm should be encouraged to do so, and contingencies should be in place for managing spontaneous disarmament. These procedures may also be applied when a formal DDR process is in place, but members of armed forces and groups offer to hand over their weapons and ammunition at a location not formally designated as a DDR site. The support of UNPOL should be sought to disseminate relevant DDR communications through their Community-Oriented Policing activities, thus facilitating the spontaneous disarmament and the reintegration of former combatants into communities.

97. Procedures for spontaneous disarmament should be communicated to the host nation authorities, to armed forces and groups and to local communities in order to encourage individuals to leave the armed forces and groups.

98. The UN Mission should identify a series of potential reception points, such as specified locations close to DDR offices or peacekeeping camps. In each of these identified sites, a member of the staff (military or civilian) should be appointed to act as the focal point for spontaneous DDR. This individual, supported by other experts where available at the location, should follow all of the procedures detailed in this SOP as far as practicable. In this regard, they should be able to:

a) Receive members of armed forces and groups wishing to disarm, identify them and record an individual’s details.

b) Safely receive and handle surrendered weapons and place them in secure temporary storage.

c) Safely receive and handle surrendered SAA and place it in safe and secure temporary storage.

d) Direct the placement of unsafe weapons and ammunition, plus ammunition and explosives in UN HD 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3,[6] in a pre-identified area as advised by a DDR WAM advisor, which can be adequately guarded to prevent diversion. These items

[6] Ammunition in HD 1.1 presents a Mass Explosion Hazard, HD 1.2 presents a Projection Hazard and HD 1.3 presents a Fire Hazard. (IATG 01.50 section 6.1 Table 1)

should not be accepted into storage until inspected and assessed as safe by a suitably qualified and authorized WAM specialist.

99. Whenever feasible, the DDR section at the UN Mission HQ should be prepared to deploy mobile DDR teams to support spontaneous disarmament tasks. In such cases, the principles detailed in procedure D1 should be complied with to the greatest extent possible. The mobile DDR teams shall be gender balanced and, as a minimum, a mobile DDR team should comprise:

a) DDR specialist as Team Leader.

b) A MILOBS or other suitable qualified and authorised weapons handler.

c) A WAM specialist. The WAM specialist will normally be a qualified EOD operator; otherwise, EOD support should also be provided.

d) A gender advisor.

e) A child protection trained staff member to look after individuals less than 18 years old.

100. As soon as possible after acts of spontaneous disarmament, action shall be taken to remove weapons and ammunition from the temporary disarmament site to more permanent storage facilities pending disposal. Items deemed unsafe to move shall be destroyed in situ.

Technical Guidance – Managing Spontaneous Disarmament
IDDRS 04.10 “Disarmament”
MOSAIC 02.30 “SALW Control in the Context of DDR”
MOSAIC 05.40 “Collection of Illicit and Unwanted SALW”

E. TRAINING

101. All personnel involved in DDR activities in UN Missions should receive training on the DDR WAM standard operating procedures and be made fully aware of the chain of procedures involved as well as the roles and responsibilities in conducting disarmament operations and transitional WAM activities. This training should be developed in accordance with the Mission’s standard operating procedure and include relevant gender and youth considerations.

102. All personnel involved in DDR activities should also receive basic levels of training on the dangers of weapons and ammunition. This training should be undertaken prior to deployment to the Mission whenever possible, but if undertaken in country, it must be completed before the individual deploys on DDR-related activities. The level of training provided will not make an individual competent to handle weapons and ammunition, but it should make them aware of both the inherent hazards and the organizations and/or personnel they should seek advice from whenever weapons and ammunition are to be collected.

103. MILOBS, other UN Force and UNPOL personnel, and any other UN or associated staff required to handle weapons should receive training to familiarize them with the weapons

they may be expected to handle. The minimum level of training required is to include identification of weapons; the principles of how a weapon is operated; how to unload the weapon and confirm it is in a safe condition; and safe storage of weapons.

104. Many staff involved in handling weapons during DDR processes will have relevant prior experience and qualifications in weapons handling. Individual assessments should be made prior to deployment and refresher training offered where necessary. All staff may not be familiar with all different types of weapons that may be encountered, but some individuals should have knowledge of the principle of operation of all major weapon types.

105. The additional safety aspects involved with the handling, storage and ultimate disposal of ammunition and explosives dictates that most WAM personnel will be appropriately qualified prior to joining the Mission. These personnel shall be qualified according to the competences defined in IATG 01.90, “Ammunition Management Personnel Competences”, and/or IMAS 09.30, “T&EP EOD Competence Standards”. Training to these competence standards is provided largely by military training establishments, although there are some commercial providers. Individuals appointed to WAM roles must be able to demonstrate their competence level prior to joining the Mission. Induction and Mission-specific training may be required on arrival with the Mission.

F. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

106. Field-level WAM SOP should be issued under the authority of the Head of Mission.

107. Specific responsibilities within each Mission may vary, but the following are considered to be key roles related to a field-level WAM SOP:

a) UN Mission HQ – Head of Mission (under whose authority the Mission WAM SOP should be issued)

b) UN Mission HQ – Senior DDR Officer

c) UN Mission Force Commander

d) UN Mission MILOBS

e) UN Mission Police Commissioner/Head of Police Component

f) WAM Advisor (Mission WAM SOP should include contact details for the WAM Advisor, including 24-hour emergency contact procedures)

g) UNMAS

G. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

108. In this SOP the words ‘shall’, ‘should’, ‘may’ and ‘can’ are used to express provisions in accordance with their usage in ISO standards[7]:

a) **'shall'** is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications that are to be applied in order to conform to the standard.

b) **'should'** is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.

c) **'may'** is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.

d) **‘can’** is used to indicate a possibility and capability.

e) **‘must’** is used to indicate an external constraint or obligation.

109. A list of acronyms, terms and definitions used in this SOP is included at Annex A.

H. REFERENCES

110. Normative References

a) International Ammunition Technical Guidelines [UN SaferGuard]

b) Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards [UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR]

c) Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium [UNODA]

d) Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context: Handbook for United Nations DDR practitioners [UN DPO/ODA]

111. Related Procedures and Guidelines

a) Universal Declaration on Human Rights

b) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

c) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

d) International Mine Action Standards

e) Making Room for Improvement: Gender Dimensions of the Life-cycle Management of Ammunition [UN 2020]

f) UN Policy on Weapons and Ammunition Management (2019.03)

g) UN Manual on Ammunition Management (2019.27)

h) SOP on Loss of Weapons and Ammunition in Peace Operations (2019.04)

I. MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE

[7] The IATG and MOSAIC use slightly different definitions for these meanings, but the ISO standards methodology remains the same.

112. Compliance with this SOP shall be monitored by the DDR Section, DPO, in consultation with ODA and DOS, the co-signatories of this SOP. Before the mandatory revision date of the SOP, the DDR Section intends, resource permitting, to conduct an external evaluation of the application of the SOP in order to ensure its continued relevance. The SOP is expected to be translated into field-level SOPs, which shall be in line with this SOP.

J. CONTACT

113. The contact for this SOP is the DDR Section, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), Department of Peace Operations (unhqddr@un.org).

K. HISTORY

114. This is the first issue of joint DPO-ODA-DOS SOP on WAM in DDR Processes

115. This SOP will be reviewed every three years by DPO, ODA and DOS taking into account of feedback from WAM and DDR practitioners employed in Missions.

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Annex A

List of Acronyms, Terms and Definitions

	Batch	A discrete quantity of ammunition which is assembled from two or more lotted components (one of which will be the Primary Governing Component,) is as homogeneous as possible and, under similar conditions, may be expected to give uniform performance [IATG 01.40].
CG	Compatibility Group	Grouping identified by a letter which shows those explosives which may be stored or transported together without significantly increasing the probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident [IATG 01.40].
CVR	Community Violence Reduction	CVR is a DDR-related tool which can be implemented in peacekeeping operations and special political missions and in non-mission settings, aimed at preventing and reducing violence at the community level in ongoing armed conflict or in post-conflict environments [UN].
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration	Integrated DDR processes contribute to the entire peace continuum, from prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, to peacebuilding and development. They are made up of different combinations of DDR programmes, DDR-related tools, and reintegration support in the absence of DDR programmes, including when complementing DDR-related tools.
DG	Dangerous Goods	items classified under the UN system within Classes 1 to 9 in accordance with the UN Transport of Dangerous Goods Regulations [IATG 01.40].
DPO	Department of Peace Operations	
DPPA	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	
ELL	Explosives Limit Licence	
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	The detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance [IATG 01.40].
ES	Exposed Site	A magazine, cell, stack, truck or trailer loaded with ammunition, explosives workshop, inhabited building, assembly place or public traffic route which is exposed to the effects of an explosion (or fire) at the PES site under consideration [IATG 01.40].
HCC	Hazard Classification Code	An alpha-numeric symbol which denotes the complete hazard classification for a particular nature of ammunition/explosives [IATG 01.40].
HD	Hazard Division	The UN classification system that identifies explosive hazardous substances [IATG 01.40].
HQ	Headquarters	

IATG	International Ammunition Technical Guidelines	A frame of reference to achieve and demonstrate effective levels of safety and security of ammunition stockpiles [UN SaferGuard webpage].
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards	A set of standards originally developed to provide guidance in post-conflict contexts where DDR forms an integral part of comprehensive peace agreements, usually where peace operations have also been established and mandated to support national DDR efforts [unddr.org].
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards	A standards framework to actively drive safety, quality and efficiency [in mine action]. It therefore ensures confidence in mine action products across the sector [mineactionstandards.org].
IMS	Information Management System	
	Lot	A lot is a predetermined quantity of ammunition or components which is as homogeneous as possible and, under similar conditions, may be expected to give uniform performance [IATG 01.40].
MILOBS	Military Observer	
MOSAIC	Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium	A set of voluntary, practical guidance notes that each combine the best small-arms expertise in succinct, operational advice [MOSAIC webpage].
NEQ	Net Explosive Quantity	The total explosive content present in a container, ammunition, building etc, unless it has been determined that the effective quantity is significantly different from the actual quantity [IATG 01.40].
ODA	Office for Disarmament Affairs	
PES	Potential Explosion Site	The location of a quantity of explosives that will create a blast, fragment, thermal or debris hazard in the event of an explosion of its content [IATG 01.40]
QD	Quantity Distance	The minimum permissible distance required between a PES and an ES [IATG 01.40].
RR	Resettlement and Repatriation	
RRPL	Risk Reduction Process Level	
SAA	Small Arms Ammunition	Small arms ammunition (less than 20mm calibre) consists of cartridges used in rifles, carbines, revolvers, pistols, submachine guns, and machine guns and shells used in shotguns [IATG 01.40].
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons	
SATO	Senior Ammunition Technical Officer	
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure	Instructions that define the preferred or currently established method of conducting an operational task or activity [IATG 01.40].
SRA	Security Risk Assessment	An assessment that involves identifying the risks in your organisation, technology and processes to verify that controls are in place to safeguard against security threats [ISO 27001].
T&EP	Test & Evaluation Protocol	

TWAM	Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management	A series of interim arms control measures that can be implemented by DDR practitioners before, after and alongside DDR programmes. Transitional WAM can also be implemented when the preconditions for a DDR programme are absent. The Transitional WAM component of a DDR process is primarily aimed at reducing the capacity of individuals and groups to engage in armed violence and conflict. Transitional WAM also aims to reduce accidents and save lives by addressing the immediate risks related to the possession of weapons, ammunition and explosives [IDDRS 4.11].
UN	United Nations	
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service	
UNPOL	United Nations Police	
WAAB	Weapons and Ammunition Advisory Board	Entity established in UN missions responsible for advising the mission's Senior Management Team on all aspects of WAM [UN Manual on Ammunition Management].
WAM	Weapons and Ammunition Management	The oversight, accountability and management of arms and ammunition throughout their lifecycle, including the establishment of frameworks, processes and practices for safe and secure materiel acquisition, stockpiling, transfers, tracing and disposal [IDDRS 4.11].
	WAM Adviser	Depending on the type of activities involved, WAM advisers shall have extensive formal training and operational field experience in ammunition and weapons storage, inspection, transportation and destruction/disposal, including in fragile settings, as well as experience in the development and administration of new storage facilities. If the DDR component does not include such profiles among its staff, it may rely on support from other specialist UN agencies or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The WAM adviser shall, among other things, advise on explosive safety, certify that ammunition and explosives are safe to move, identify a nearby demolition site for unsafe ammunition, conduct render-safe procedures on unsafe ammunition, and determine safety distances during collection processes.

Annex B

Example Weapons Reporting Template

Weapon Details				Photographs		
DDR Unique Identification Number:	**Make/Type:**	**Model:**	**Weapon Serial Number:**	**Weapon Serial Number**	**Weapon Right Hand Side**	**Weapon Left Hand Side**
			5366			
Calibre:	**Country of Manufacture**	**Year of Manufacture:**	**Fire Selector Description:**	**Fire Selector/ Safety Handle**	**Rear Sight**	**Muzzle / Front Sight**
		1988	Up – A Down – R			
Name / IMS Number:	**Location of Collection:**	**Date of Collection:**	**Storage Code of Location:**	**Other Markings**	**Other Markings**	**Other Markings**
					Rear site: P 10	
	Transferred by:	**Transferred to:**	**Date:**	**Description**	**Description**	**Description**
Record of Transfers:				Factory Stamp: UD-7 88-1998		
				Date of Destruction	**Method**	**Certificate Ser No:**

Modified from: Annex D to MONUSCO SOP 104.01 dated Nov 2016

Annex C

Example Ammunition Reporting Template

Ammunition Details					Photographs	
Category:	**Type:**	**Quantity:**	**Calibre:**	**Headstamp**	**Headstamp**	**Cartridge Side View**
						
Country of Origin:	**Manufacturer:**	**Year of Manufacture:**	**Length of Cartridge:**	**Lot/Batch No:**	**Packaging**	**Other Markings**
Name / IMS Number:	**Location of Collection:**	**Date of Collection:**	**Storage Code of Location:**	**Expiration Date:**	**Condition:**	**Other Markings:**
	Transferred by:	**Transferred to:**	**Date:**			
Record of Transfers:						
				Date of Destruction	**Method**	**Certificate Ser No:**

Annex D

Weapons and Ammunition Handover Certificates

Weapons Handover Certificate

Ser	Weapon Type	Weapon Serial Number	Year	Calibre	Country of Origin	Manuf.	Monograms and Special Markings	Remarks
e.g.	*AK-74 Assault Rifle*	*1234*	*1988*	*5.45mm*	*Soviet Union*	*Kalash -nikov*	*UD7-88 1988*	*2 x magazines* *Damaged stock*
1.								
2.								
3.								
4.								
5.								
6.								
7.								
8.								
9.								
10.								
11.								
12.								
13.								
14.								
15.								
16.								
17.								
18.								

HANDED OVER BY:		**TAKEN OVER BY:**	
RANK OR TITLE:		**RANK OR TITLE:**	
UN ID #:		**UN ID #:**	
SIGNATURE:		**SIGNATURE:**	
DATE:		**DATE:**	

Ammunition Handover Certificate

Ser	Ammunition Type	Lot/Batch Number or Headstamp	Qty	Calibre	Country of Origin	Manuf.	Monograms and Special Markings	Remarks
e.g.	*7.62 x 51mm Ball*	*RG 011098C*	*1000*	*7.62mm*	*UK*	*RO*	*RG 10 98 Headstamp*	*In steel H82 ammo boxes*
1.								
2.								
3.								
4.								
5.								
6.								
7.								
8.								
9.								
10.								
11.								
12.								
13.								
14.								
15.								
16.								
17.								
18.								

HANDED OVER BY:		**TAKEN OVER BY:**	
RANK OR TITLE:		**RANK OR TITLE:**	
UN ID #:		**UN ID #:**	
SIGNATURE:		**SIGNATURE:**	
DATE:		**DATE:**	

Annex E

Weapons and Ammunition Destruction Certificates

Weapons Destruction Certificate

Ser	DDR Unique ID #	Weapon Type	Weapon Serial Number	Method of Destruction	Magazines/ Other Ancillaries	Remarks
e.g.	*UN-Msn 20/10 0789*	*AK-74 Assault Rifle*	*1234*	*Cut – 4 parts (hydraulic shears)*	*2 mags.*	*Mags cut in half (hydraulic shears)*
1.						
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
6.						
7.						
8.						
9.						
10.						
11.						
12.						
13.						
14.						
15.						
16.						
17.						
18.						

DDR PRACTITIONER:		**DESTROYED BY:**	
RANK OR TITLE:		**RANK OR TITLE:**	
UN ID #:		**UN ID #:**	
SIGNATURE:		**SIGNATURE:**	
DATE:		**DATE:**	

Ammunition Destruction Certificate

Ser	Quantity	Ammunition Type	Calibre	Lot/Batch Number or Headstamp	Method of Destruction	Remarks
e.g.	*10kg*	*C4 Plastic Explosive*	*N/A*	*AB002D*	*Open Detonation*	
1.						
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
6.						
7.						
8.						
9.						
10.						
11.						
12.						
13.						
14.						
15.						
16.						
17.						
18.						

DDR PRACTITIONER:		**DESTROYED BY:**	
RANK OR TITLE:		**RANK OR TITLE:**	
UN ID #:		**UN ID #:**	
SIGNATURE:		**SIGNATURE:**	
DATE:		**DATE:**	

Annex F

Example of a disarmament camp diagram